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Recommendations
• Digital development needs to be followed up by a focus on 
digital security. Here donor countries can assist with projects 
focused on improving the analogue foundations for the dig-
ital technology such as knowledge, information, education, 
employment and institutions – but also by facilitating arenas 
where experience and lessons learnt can be shared at local, 
national and regional levels. 
• Combining development assistance with multilateral diploma-
cy, through cyber security capacity building (CCB), could pro-
vide excellent opportunities for donor countries to strengthen 
long-term interests like the production of new norms, as well 
as following up on the SDG commitments by contributing to 
the digital revolution in developing countries. 
• Because primarily commercial interests have driven digitali-
zation, greater public–private cooperation is necessary in the 
development sector. 
• Developing countries should be trained in how to gear them-
selves to become part of the international CERT cooperation. 
Donor countries could help to facilitate this through capacity 
building and by improving knowledge and expertise in devel-
oping countries about CERTs.
• While maintaining the focus and often prioritized collabora-
tion with international organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO 
and AU, donor countries should also seek ways of working 
together with major private enterprises, perhaps especially 
when engaging in development and cyber security. 
• Awareness-raising information campaigns and gatherings 
with constellations of authorities, local authorities, interna-
tional organizations, national organizations, NGOs, private 
actors, senior networks and women networks may consider-
ably improve the level of cyber security level within a country. 
The awareness dimension and the facilitation of various niche 
capabilities and institution-building are also areas where do-
nor countries’ expertise could be exported, to help in counter-
acting the hollow digitization of developing countries.
• Other potential niche capabilities for export through devel-
opment activities include awareness campagnes such as na-
tional security month and Security Divas – the latter in par-
ticular would readily fit with many donor countries traditions 
of enhancing and strengthening women’s rights and security 
in developing countries.
Introduction 
Connection to digital networks have a fundamental impact on 
societies, changing not only how individuals and businesses 
navigate, operate and seek opportunities, but also how gov-
ernments must act in order to provide efficient and sustainable 
development assistance. Much policy literature on digitaliza-
tion and development has focused on the importance of con-
necting developing countries to digital networks, and how 
digital networks can expand the access to information for bil-
lions of people – and by this, also stimulate economic activity. 
While there is a wide agreement about the need to bridge the 
gap between the people who are connected to the digital net-
works, and those who are not connected, a topic that is often 
neglected is the new societal vulnerabilities emerging from 
digitalization in developing countries. 
The importance of digital technology underpins most of the 
social, economic and political development goals of most donor 
countries and international organisations today. Cyber Security 
Capacity Building (CCB), an approach aimed at advancing, 
cultivating and encouraging growth and stability in developing 
countries through digitalization, seems set to play an increas-
ingly important role in future foreign policy considerations and 
government programmes.1  
In the NUPI project ‘Cyber Security Capacity Building (2015-
2016) we have mapped out concrete risks and challenges, pro-
posed recommendations for dealing with them, and provided 
suggestions for implementing the adequate tools effectively. This 
policy brief presents a summary of the final report, which draws 
on project reports produced by NUPI related to this project.2 
 
Digital Dividends in Developing Countries
New Information- and communication technologies (ICT) are 
contributing to growth and development in developing coun-
tries through increased productivity, by providing public and 
1 CCB was initially more concerned with economic issues, followed by inter-
national security agendas and human rights. The development context is 
the latest addition to this field (see Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015: 5). 
2 Schia 2016. 
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private services to people in rural and poor areas and by pro-
moting new economic and social opportunities to people living 
in developing countries. The connections between technology 
and growth have been confirmed through statistics on the use 
of information technology, and the extent to which countries 
are connected correlates with increases in GDP (WDR 2016: 3). 
Donor countries and international organisations seize on dig-
italisation as an opportunity to fight poverty. However, digi-
talization in countries that suffer from lack of development, 
poor governance and poverty might provide new breeding 
grounds for organized crime, terrorism, and cyber security 
challenges. Thus, a new dimension of social vulnerability 
follows in the wake of the development opportunities offered 
by the digital revolution. Baseline studies have demonstrated 
the gap between development goals and intentions in donor 
policies, and digital vulnerability and cyber security in devel-
oping countries.3 In order to be sustainable, digital develop-
ment must be followed up by a focus on digital security. 
Weak technological environment
Digital technology has been used in Africa to strengthen 
internal solidarity and economic growth. In 2007, the telecom 
company Safaricom launched a mobile money service called 
M-PESA which attracted six million customers within two 
years, transferring billions annually. Through M-PESA, people 
without bank accounts could leapfrog from traditional brick-
and-mortar finance to digital economy (Mbogo 2010, Bright 
and Hruby 2015). The launch of M-PESA sparked a series of 
digital innovations in the country. In 2011, the Kenyan Red 
Cross together with Safaricom led the Kenyans for Kenya cam-
paign, raising almost 12 million dollars in four weeks for aid 
during a severe famine. The social media were also used to 
inform and coordinate help during the Westgate crisis, and the 
Kenyan Red Cross employed the social media to get donors fol-
lowing the attack (Were: 2013). A few years earlier such mobi-
lization would not have been possible. Carl Bildt, former prime 
minister and foreign minister of Sweden, is among those who 
have argued that information technology (IT) has the potential 
to become the most important tool for development to billions 
of people living in Africa and Asia (Bildt 2015). 
While the benefits from internet connection and digitalization 
are evident, there are still many hurdles that has to be dealt 
with before most people in developing countries can enjoy 
extensive use of the Internet. The digital gap is closely linked 
to the economic gap: the ‘haves’ can make use of the new 
technology and reap digital dividends, while the ‘have-nots’ 
are left behind. This is where development efforts can make a 
difference. By helping to bridge this infrastructural gap, donor 
countries can play a key role in contributing to improve the 
technological business environment in developing countries.4 
The need to build an accurate environment for technology 
before business can begin to thrive and then reap the benefits 
of digital connectivity has been emphasized by international 
organizations and policy-makers (see for instance ITU 2012, 
WDR 2016). Further research has pointed out the similar direc-
tion, like the Dalberg Report (2013) which highlights how core 
infrastructure requires an environment not just with mobile 
and internet access, but also with electricity, skills, knowl-
edge, education and awareness of corruption. Establishing a 
well-functioning internet economy is thus dependent of a set of 
conditions for usage, such as costs, education and relevance of 
services. These conditions are in turn influenced by the degree 
of access, relevance, availability and attractiveness. Core tra-
ditional development politics and projects might, therefore, 
become central elements for bridging the digital divide.
Poor Network and Infrastructure – urban-centred digi-
talization
In measuring the availability, accessibility and affordability of 
digital network and infrastructure, the World Bank has divided 
this infrastructure into three miles: i) the first mile is where the 
Internet enters a country, ii) the middle mile is where the Inter-
net spread through the country, and iii) the last mile is the level 
where the Internet actually reaches the end users.
Much has been done in African countries in order to improve 
the first mile and the international gateway, the point where 
countries connect to the global Internet. However, user con-
ditions and Internet accessibility/availability are very much 
conditioned by the middle mile, the national backbone and 
inter-city networks. These, in turn, depend on the degree of 
competition between public and private actors in the coun-
try. The rules of the market competition vary from one coun-
try to another and affect the user side of digital networks and 
infrastructure. Liberalizing the marked for the middle mile is 
an effective way of providing open access and Internet to end 
users – but as the World Bank has pointed out, this entails a 
risk ‘... that the most popular routes – say, between the two 
main cities – are ‘super-served’, while the rest of the country 
is underserved (WDR 2016: 219). 
In developing countries, the last mile is rarely served through 
fixed copper cables, as local access to networks is dominated 
by wireless alternatives. Whereas the developed countries 
had achieved almost universal fixed-line access before wire-
less technology took over around 2001, most developing 
countries never built fixed-line networks. The World Bank 
sees this point as important ‘… because wireless networks 
[…] are not fully substitutable for fixed networks […] either 
in usage (which rarely offers flat-rate pricing, without data 
limits) or in performance (where speeds are generally lower) 
[…] many developing countries are stuck with a second-class 
internet that may fail to deliver the expected benefits, espe-
cially for business users (WDR 2016: 208).  Development 
efforts needs to focus on bridging this infrastructural gap, 
as a key determinant in an enabling business environment 
(Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015: 9). 
3 See: https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/sdg/Content/wsis-sdg_booklet.
pdf and http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UN-
PAN95707.pdf in particular bulletpoint 4.
4 See Schia 2015.
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 Developing countries and new kinds of societal vulner­
abilities
ICT has become a highly important foundation for most infra-
structures in developed societies, and individuals, businesses, 
and nations are depending more and more on data and systems 
in the virtual world. Although developing countries are now 
following the path of developed countries and become more 
digitalized, they are taking a different route. For the developed 
countries, digitalization has been a long-term sequential evolu-
tion. Initially based on state-led investments in fixed telephone 
infrastructure, it was followed by private initiatives and inno-
vations, and then, building on this infrastructure, established 
gradually, came the addition of mobile phones, the Internet, 
and smartphones. Developing countries, by contrast, are leap-
frogging straight into wireless technology and mobile devices, 
and Internet networks are often built by the private sector. This 
means that digital technologies are being put to use before 
functional, regulatory mechanisms have been developed and 
put in place. This opens the way to new kinds of vulnerabilities.
Developing countries become digitalized rapidly, but they are 
weak in the knowhow, awareness, institutions and skills needed 
for dealing with cyber security issues. This vulnerability can be 
met through development assistance from donor countries to 
projects focusing on awareness, knowledge, information, edu-
cation and employment. In this context, Cyber Security Capac-
ity Building (CCB) becomes integral to development.5 
The Security-Development nexus
Drawing on the scholarly tradition on the security-development 
nexus, Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015) identify Cyber Security 
Capacity Building (CCB) as a key component of development. 
They hold that this combination is particularly important 
because: “… the areas with the highest potential for economic 
growth correspond roughly with those where the security risks 
are the highest [and] the skills developed locally through cyber 
security training correspond to those needed to enable local 
businesses to scale up, without having to rely on outside, more 
expensive talent.” (Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015:10). 
The NUPI project ‘Cyber Security Capacity Building’ (2015-
2016) has identified three main reasons why CCB will be 
increasingly important for the development-security nexus: 
1) access to cyberspace is essential to social, economic and 
political stability, so the importance of, and need for, CCB 
measures and programmes for regional stability will grow. 2) 
Developing countries are increasingly becoming hosts to the 
infrastructure and actors behind malicious cyber activities. 
Bridging the digital divide is important also with regard to 
responding to national security and various types of cyber 
threats in donor countries. 3) The international debate about 
governing the Internet is becoming increasingly politicized. 
Many developing countries hold swing-state positions in this 
political landscape, and their influence and importance are 
likely to grow (Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015).
International cyber politics and developing countries 
as potential swing­states
Due to the rapid development of ICT, and the even more rapid 
pace of connectivity across the globe, old political challenges 
in international relations resurface in new and sometimes 
unexpected ways. In this new political landscape, there is a 
dire need for new norms, policies and trust-building measures. 
The multi-stakeholder approach hailed as a way forward in 
international relations concerned with cyberspace, involves 
states, international organizations, private actors, think 
tanks, and NGOs. In this way, cyberspace as a political topic 
in international relations incorporates new kinds of partner-
ships. While international bodies like the UN, EU and NATO 
are important players in developing international cyberspace 
policy, the technical revolution is run by the private sector. 
Thus, while maintain its focus and prioritize collaboration 
with international organizations, Norway should also seek 
ways of working together with major private enterprises, 
perhaps especially in connection with development and aid. 
Another challenge is that many governments in the developing 
world lack the knowledge, awareness and mature policies about 
cyberspace and cyber security, necessary for participating fully 
in discussions about cyber politics in the global arena. Through 
development assistance, focusing on cyber security capacity 
building (CCB), there is a potential for developing coopera-
tion and partnerships with developing countries, in our effort 
towards a secure and sustainable cyberspace. As pointed out 
in a recent NUPI Report, the dichotomous character of interna-
tional cyber policy on how Internet should be governed implies 
that ‘… the importance of the ‘swing-states’ – nearly all within 
the developing world – rises’ (Klimburg and Zylberberg, 2015: 
46). Collaboration among academic institutions, national and 
international organizations, and decision makers from donor 
and recipient countries seems the most natural way to explore 
these links and identify potential partnerships for cyber policy 
in international forums. Thus, CCB seems set to become an 
increasingly important arena for international diplomacy.
Norway has the comparative advantage of a long tracked 
record within the development industry, but also as regards 
multilateral diplomatic negotiations. Combining these two 
dimensions could offer great potentials for strengthening 
Norwegian long-term interests such as the production of 
new norms, as well as following up on the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) commitments by contributing to 
the digital revolution in develop ing countries. 
Development, local ownership and cyber space
Most donor-driven development assistance is in one way or 
another concerned with the ‘ownership debate’. Although 
not yet very prominent in policy documents, this debate is 
also relevant for the cyber security capacity building (CCB) 
projects. Because of the role assumed by the private sector in 
the digital revolution, the public-private relationship in this 
field should also be viewed in terms of ‘ownership’. 5 See also Pawlak 2014. 
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Ownership and public-private cooperation
Most of the world’s critical cyber assets are owned and man-
aged by private enterprises. This means that states are depend-
ent on private companies in order to provide public security. 
Cyber security differs from other security areas in one key way: 
traditionally it has been private actors who have been entering 
into state security domains, but with cyber security it is the 
other way around. States are now trying to (re)establish, take 
ownership, and gain terrain in cyberspace, a space which has 
been cultivated by innovative companies and consumers – but 
also by criminal elements. For donor countries engaged with 
aid and development in developing countries, this represents 
a challenge, because many of the structural assumptions 
about ownership, authority, and governance that has previ-
ously been taken for granted, must now be questioned. 
This will require mapping such structural challenges and 
identifying potentials for public-private cooperation in 
development engagements in developing countries. Topics 
that could be explored for potential donor involvement con-
cerning ownership include social responsibility and cyber 
security, lawful intercept and authority requests, security and 
privacy, public awareness, ethical challenges, and possible 
constellations with governments, private actors, and NGOs.
Conclusion
Digitalization and cyber security as new global challenges are 
becoming increasingly central to the organization of develop-
ment assistance – with consequences for billions of people in 
the developing world. With the emergence of digitalization 
and cyber security challenges, the transfer of knowledge and 
experiences from traditional donor countries to the develop-
ing countries become crucial, perhaps even more important 
than the transfer of funding. In the long term, this develop-
ment may contribute to more equal partnerships, in which 
the interests of donors as well as of recipient countries are 
safeguarded. 
The Cyber Security Capacity Building project (2015-2016) 
indicates that there are opportunities for donor countries 
in this field. Digitalization brings with it a pressing need for 
knowledge, education, institution building and experience 
sharing among countries and regions. Although traditional 
development mechanisms can be applied to enhance sustain-
able development through building cyber security capacity, this 
combination also introduces new aspects and dilemmas in the 
field of development. Private actors have dominated the trajec-
tory of the digital revolution. The digital environment, or cyber-
space, has been fostered and developed by companies and 
consumers – and also by less honourable actors. This trajectory 
has produced a set-up in which private actors have assumed 
the dominant role. For development actors, this represents a 
challenge, because many of the structural assumptions about 
ownership, authority, and governance that have underpinned 
traditional development policies are now turned upside-down. 
Building cyber security capacity in developing countries must 
be conducted on several levels, simultaneously, through a 
holistic approach. There are the technological, organiza-
tional and human dimensions, and the local, national and 
international levels. Norway has long traditions of successful 
international engagement in working on all these levels, and 
the importance of exchanging knowledge, lessons learnt and 
building trust between countries has often been emphasised. 
Building capacity in cyber security represents a relatively new 
political field, not properly included in the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) 2015, and neither in the World 
Bank’s World Development Report – Digital Dividends (2016). 
Donor countries like Norway can continue their long-term 
foreign policy traditions by incorporating a new policy field. 
Distinct properties of cyberspace – such as the fact that it has 
no borders, few rules and a free flow of information – trigger 
new kinds of challenges with regard to international politics 
and diplomacy. Managing such challenges will require an in-
depth understanding of the democratic, social and economic 
development contexts on which cyberspace depends.
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